TLS (Transport Layer Security) is the protocol that establishes an encrypted, integrity-protected, and authenticated channel between two parties over an untrusted network. It is the successor to SSL (which is deprecated and broken) and the mechanism behind HTTPS, gRPC, LDAPS, SMTPS, database connections, and most other encrypted transport in modern infrastructure. The current version is TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446, 2018); TLS 1.2 remains in wide use but TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated by RFC 8996. The fundamental security properties TLS provides are: confidentiality (a passive observer cannot read the session content), integrity (an active attacker cannot modify session content without detection), and server authentication (the client can verify it is talking to the intended server rather than an impersonator). Client authentication is optional in standard TLS and is provided by mTLS.
A TLS connection begins with a handshake that negotiates session parameters and establishes a shared secret. In TLS 1.3, the handshake is significantly simplified over 1.2: the client sends a ClientHello containing supported cipher suites and a key share (a Diffie-Hellman or ML-KEM public key value in PQC-hybrid deployments); the server responds with a ServerHello selecting the cipher suite, its own key share, and its X.509 certificate; both sides derive the session keys from the combined DH output; the server immediately sends a Finished message authenticated with those keys, and the handshake is complete in one round trip (1-RTT), with session resumption possible at 0-RTT for returning clients. The server’s certificate is signed by a CA in the client’s trust store, proving server identity; the client checks that the server’s hostname matches a SAN in the certificate and that the certificate chain validates to a trusted root and is not expired or revoked. After the handshake, all data is encrypted with AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) ciphers — in TLS 1.3, either AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 — which simultaneously provide confidentiality and integrity, making separate MAC computation unnecessary. Forward secrecy is mandatory in TLS 1.3: the ephemeral DH key exchange means that even if the server’s long-term private key is later compromised, previously recorded sessions cannot be decrypted, since the session key was never persisted.
TLS is the transport layer on which the rest of the security stack in this glossary is composed. mTLS extends it with client certificates for mutual authentication. SPIFFE/SPIRE uses X.509-SVIDs in TLS handshakes to provide workload-to-workload mTLS with zero static secrets. Vault exposes its API over TLS and issues short-lived TLS certificates via its PKI engine. Trustee and the KBS use attested TLS (aTLS) — a variant where the server’s TLS certificate is bound to a TEE attestation report, so the client simultaneously establishes an encrypted channel and verifies it is talking to a genuine TDX or SEV-SNP guest. The PQC transition affects TLS at the key exchange and authentication layers: ML-KEM replaces ECDH for key establishment (already deployed in hybrid form in Chrome and OpenSSL 3.4+), and ML-DSA replaces ECDSA for certificate signatures in the server’s X.509 certificate chain — addressing both the HNDL threat to confidentiality (via key exchange) and the long-term threat to server authentication (via certificate signatures).
