<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Allowlisting on Le Site de François</title><link>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/tags/allowlisting/</link><description>Recent content in Allowlisting on Le Site de François</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en</language><copyright>© 2026 François</copyright><atom:link href="https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/tags/allowlisting/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>fapolicyd (File Access Policy Daemon)</title><link>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/security/fapolicyd/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/security/fapolicyd/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;fapolicyd (File Access Policy Daemon)&lt;/strong&gt; is an application allowlisting framework for Linux, developed by Red Hat and shipped as a supported component of RHEL 8+. Its security premise is supply-chain integrity at the execution layer: only software that was installed through a trusted package manager (DNF/RPM) or explicitly declared as trusted by an administrator may execute on the system. An attacker who achieves a foothold and drops a new binary — a reverse shell, a lateral movement tool, a cryptominer — will find that binary blocked at execution time, because it is absent from the trust database, regardless of its Unix permissions or SELinux label. fapolicyd addresses a different dimension of access control than &lt;strong&gt;SELinux&lt;/strong&gt;: SELinux models how applications behave (what resources they may access); fapolicyd models whether applications are trusted at all (whether they may execute in the first place). The two are complementary: SELinux confines a trusted application&amp;rsquo;s behaviour; fapolicyd prevents untrusted applications from running.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>