<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Ceph on Le Site de François</title><link>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/tags/ceph/</link><description>Recent content in Ceph on Le Site de François</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en</language><copyright>© 2026 François</copyright><atom:link href="https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/tags/ceph/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Storage Encryption</title><link>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/security/storage-encryption/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/security/storage-encryption/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Storage encryption is not a single feature but a &lt;strong&gt;four-layer decision&lt;/strong&gt; that must be made independently, because each layer addresses a different adversary and a different failure mode. &lt;strong&gt;Layer 1 — disk/OSD at-rest encryption&lt;/strong&gt; protects against physical media theft: a decommissioned OSD or stolen drive is unreadable without the key. &lt;strong&gt;Layer 2 — cluster-internal wire encryption&lt;/strong&gt; protects against a network-layer attacker who can observe traffic between storage nodes: OSDs, monitors, and clients on the cluster network. &lt;strong&gt;Layer 3 — PV/volume-level encryption&lt;/strong&gt; protects against a storage operator or another tenant reading a workload&amp;rsquo;s data through the storage system itself — the threat model where the storage cluster is itself potentially untrusted or multi-tenant. &lt;strong&gt;Layer 4 — object storage server-side encryption&lt;/strong&gt; provides per-object key management for S3-compatible workloads, enabling customer-managed keys (CMK) and per-tenant key isolation in object stores. These layers are &lt;strong&gt;independent and composable&lt;/strong&gt;: enabling Layer 1 without Layer 2 protects against physical theft but not a network interceptor; enabling Layer 3 without Layer 1 protects against the storage operator but not physical media extraction. A complete encryption posture addresses all four explicitly, even if some layers are deliberately left disabled with a documented rationale.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>