<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Fips on Le Site de François</title><link>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/tags/fips/</link><description>Recent content in Fips on Le Site de François</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en</language><copyright>© 2026 François</copyright><atom:link href="https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/tags/fips/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>HSM (Hardware Security Module)</title><link>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/security/hsm/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/security/hsm/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;A &lt;strong&gt;Hardware Security Module (HSM)&lt;/strong&gt; is a purpose-built, tamper-resistant hardware device that holds cryptographic keys and performs cryptographic operations — signing, encryption, decryption, random number generation — entirely within its own protected boundary. The defining property is that private keys generated inside an HSM never exist in plaintext outside it: operations that need the key are sent into the HSM and the result is returned, but the key material itself cannot be extracted. This property is enforced both logically (the firmware refuses export in plaintext) and physically (the device detects and responds to tampering by erasing key material before an attacker can read it). HSMs come in several physical forms: network-attached appliances (rack-mounted devices accessed over the network by many clients), PCIe cards (embedded in a server), and compact USB devices for lower-throughput use cases like protecting CA root keys offline.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>