<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Firmware on Le Site de François</title><link>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/tags/firmware/</link><description>Recent content in Firmware on Le Site de François</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en</language><copyright>© 2026 François</copyright><atom:link href="https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/tags/firmware/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Measured Boot</title><link>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/security/measured-boot/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/security/measured-boot/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Measured Boot&lt;/strong&gt; is a boot process architecture in which each component in the boot chain — firmware, bootloader, kernel, initrd, kernel command line — is cryptographically hashed and that hash is recorded into a &lt;strong&gt;TPM&lt;/strong&gt; Platform Configuration Register (PCR) before the component executes. The critical distinction from &lt;strong&gt;Secure Boot&lt;/strong&gt; is in what each mechanism provides: Secure Boot is an &lt;em&gt;enforcement&lt;/em&gt; mechanism that prevents unauthorised components from running at all; Measured Boot is a &lt;em&gt;recording&lt;/em&gt; mechanism that creates a tamper-evident log of exactly what did run, without necessarily preventing anything. The two are complementary and typically deployed together — Secure Boot enforces a policy at boot time, Measured Boot produces the evidence that the policy was enforced as claimed. A system can have Measured Boot without Secure Boot (it records everything that ran, even unsigned components), but Secure Boot without Measured Boot provides enforcement with no attestable evidence of what was enforced.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Secure Boot (UEFI Secure Boot)</title><link>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/security/secure-boot/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/security/secure-boot/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;UEFI Secure Boot&lt;/strong&gt; is a firmware-level mechanism that ensures each binary executed during the boot process — bootloader, kernel, UEFI drivers — is cryptographically signed by a key the firmware trusts, before it is allowed to run. It is defined in the UEFI specification and implemented by the firmware on virtually all modern x86 and ARM platforms. Its threat model is bootkits and rootkits that install themselves before the OS loads and therefore survive reboots, OS reinstalls, and cannot be detected by any software running after them.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>