<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Lattice on Le Site de François</title><link>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/tags/lattice/</link><description>Recent content in Lattice on Le Site de François</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en</language><copyright>© 2026 François</copyright><atom:link href="https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/tags/lattice/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>ML-DSA (Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm)</title><link>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/security/ml-dsa/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/security/ml-dsa/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;ML-DSA (Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm)&lt;/strong&gt;, standardised as &lt;strong&gt;NIST FIPS 204&lt;/strong&gt; in August 2024, is the primary post-quantum replacement for digital signatures. It replaces &lt;strong&gt;ECDSA&lt;/strong&gt;, &lt;strong&gt;EdDSA&lt;/strong&gt;, and &lt;strong&gt;RSA&lt;/strong&gt; PSS/PKCS#1 signatures in &lt;strong&gt;X.509&lt;/strong&gt; certificates, code signing, TLS client and server authentication, SSH, JWT signing, and any other context where a party proves possession of a private key by producing a signature that others verify with the public key. ML-DSA is derived from CRYSTALS-Dilithium, the submission that won NIST&amp;rsquo;s lattice-based signature selection, and its security rests on the &lt;strong&gt;Module Learning With Errors (MLWE)&lt;/strong&gt; and &lt;strong&gt;Module Short Integer Solution (MSIS)&lt;/strong&gt; problems — the same mathematical family as &lt;strong&gt;ML-KEM&lt;/strong&gt;, which is significant because both algorithms can share implementation code and hardware acceleration for the underlying polynomial arithmetic (NTT, number-theoretic transform).&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism)</title><link>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/security/ml-kem/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://lesitedefrancois.be/en/security/ml-kem/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism)&lt;/strong&gt;, standardised as &lt;strong&gt;NIST FIPS 203&lt;/strong&gt; in August 2024, is the primary post-quantum replacement for key encapsulation and key exchange. It replaces the role of &lt;strong&gt;ECDH&lt;/strong&gt; (X25519, P-256) and RSA key transport in &lt;strong&gt;TLS&lt;/strong&gt; handshakes, &lt;strong&gt;IPsec&lt;/strong&gt; IKEv2 negotiations, and any other protocol that needs two parties to establish a shared secret without prior key material. ML-KEM is derived from CRYSTALS-Kyber, the submission that won NIST&amp;rsquo;s lattice-based KEM selection, and its security rests on the &lt;strong&gt;Module Learning With Errors (MLWE)&lt;/strong&gt; problem: distinguishing a structured noisy linear system from a random one is computationally hard, and no efficient quantum algorithm for this problem is known. The &amp;ldquo;module&amp;rdquo; qualifier means the construction uses polynomial rings structured in a way that allows a good balance between security and efficiency, contrasting with pure LWE (larger keys, simpler structure) and NTRU (smaller keys, different structure).&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>